Psychology Reader

What Kinds of Things Are Psychiatric Disorders?

Kenneth S. Kendler, Peter Zachar, and Carl F. Craver · 2011 · Psychological Medicine

Role
Foundational argument
Difficulty
Challenging
Full work length
8 pages
Type
Journal article

Access

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Reading focus

Syllabus: What Is a Mental Disorder?

Compare the kinds of explanation that could hold a diagnostic grouping together. Ask what is gained or lost when no single property is shared by every case.

Why you’re reading it. Consider what a classification could track beyond a useful label or a statistical cluster.

A question to consider. Two people share a diagnosis but have partly different symptoms and causal histories. How could a mechanistic property-cluster account accommodate this, and what evidence would make that account more than a description?

Why this reading

A pattern of symptoms does not tell us what kind of thing a diagnosis names. This essay compares essentialist, socially constructed, practical, and mechanistic-property-cluster accounts. Its positive proposal provides a way to think about real causal organization without requiring one defining essence shared by every case.

Before you read

An essence is a defining underlying property. A practical kind is organized around usefulness. A mechanistic property cluster is sustained by interacting causal processes. These are philosophical accounts of classification, not competing statistical models fitted in the paper.

Read for

  1. Identify the problem each account solves and the commitments it brings.
  2. Ask how the authors can defend causal reality while allowing fuzzy boundaries and varied mechanisms.
  3. Distinguish what makes a cluster non-arbitrary from what separates one disorder from another.
  4. Examine what the proposal asks empirical research to discover.

Consider afterwards

  1. What would show that a useful diagnostic grouping also tracks a causal structure?
  2. How could different mechanisms produce cases that still belong to the same kind?

Editorial context

The authors discuss practical kinds but advocate the more ambitious mechanistic-property-cluster account for causal classification. The proposal does not supply an operational test for every diagnosis. In their reply to Oulis, they distinguish explaining why properties cluster from completely resolving how psychiatric kinds should be individuated. Keep that limit in view when connecting the essay to dimensional or network approaches.