How Can We Study the Mind?
An introduction to cognitive processes and the evidence used to explain them.
- Level
- Introductory
- Reading load
- 11 core readings in 6 units
- Prerequisites
- No prior course in cognitive psychology is required. The guides introduce the key terms and explain what the methods can reveal.
- Last reviewed
- September 2026
Introduction
The mind is known through what it makes possible: a remembered event, an understood instruction, a choice among imagined futures. We observe the response and seek the activity behind it. To call that activity memory or thought gives the problem a name; to explain it we need an account of the information used, the processes involved, and evidence that favors this account over another.
This path introduces cognition through eleven works across six units. Conceptual papers and reviews provide terms and competing explanations; experiments and clinical observations show how those explanations can be constrained. We begin with how the mind might represent information about the world, then turn to perception and attention, memory, concepts and language, reasoning and choice, and the role of the body and environment.
Keep three questions in view: What is observed? What information or process is proposed? What else could produce the observation? By the end, you should be able to apply those questions to an everyday cognitive task and propose a useful comparison. Some arguments are demanding; the aim is to understand their reasoning and limits, not to arrive with a methods course already completed.
Unit 1 of 6
How can behavior reveal a mental process?
A cognitive explanation must connect an unobserved process to something we can examine. Miller introduces the explanatory project; Shepard and Metzler give a compact example of using a pattern of response times to constrain it.
Reading
1 of 11The Cognitive Revolution: A Historical Perspective
Miller, G. A. (2003). The cognitive revolution: A historical perspective. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 7(3), 141–144. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1364-6613(03)00029-9
Historical turning point · Critical reappraisal · Accessible · Full work: 4 pages
Use this historical argument to distinguish naming a mental process from explaining how it works. Notice both the promise of representations and the need to make their proposed operations specific.
A question to consider. Someone says that a person navigates by consulting a mental map. What prediction would make this account more informative than saying that the person remembers the route?
Reading
2 of 11Mental Rotation of Three-Dimensional Objects
Shepard, R. N., & Metzler, J. (1971). Mental rotation of three-dimensional objects. Science, 171(3972), 701–703. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.171.3972.701
Landmark empirical study · Methodological contribution · Accessible · Full work: 3 pages
Apply the opening distinction to mental rotation. Track how a controlled difference between stimuli becomes evidence for a proposed transformation, while leaving other parts of the task to be explained.
A question to consider. What would a flat relation between angle and response time mean for the proposed account, and what alternative strategy might produce it?
Unit 2 of 6
How is information perceived and selected?
Information reaching the senses is not the same as a reported percept or a noticed event. These studies distinguish combining information across senses from selecting information while engaged in a task.
Reading
3 of 11Hearing Lips and Seeing Voices
McGurk, H., & MacDonald, J. (1976). Hearing lips and seeing voices. Nature, 264(5588), 746–748. https://doi.org/10.1038/264746a0
Landmark empirical study · Accessible · Full work: 3 pages
Examine how a change in visible speech can alter what a person reports hearing. The teaching purpose is to infer an interaction between sources of information, not merely to demonstrate a surprising illusion.
A question to consider. What result would support visual influence while leaving open whether it changed perception or only the eventual response?
Reading
4 of 11Gorillas in Our Midst: Sustained Inattentional Blindness for Dynamic Events
Simons, D. J., & Chabris, C. F. (1999). Gorillas in our midst: Sustained inattentional blindness for dynamic events. Perception, 28(9), 1059–1074. https://doi.org/10.1068/p281059
Landmark empirical study · Methodological contribution · Moderate · Full work: 16 pages
Compare availability of visual information with reported noticing. Use the differences among conditions to ask how the observer’s task shapes selection.
A question to consider. If the unexpected event becomes part of the announced task, why would that change what the experiment can tell us about inattentional blindness?
Unit 3 of 6
What does remembering require?
Memory is not one undifferentiated ability. Cowan clarifies competing distinctions among retention, attention, and stored knowledge. The clinical report then asks what patterns of loss and preservation can establish about memory’s organization.
Reading
5 of 11What Are the Differences Between Long-Term, Short-Term, and Working Memory?
Cowan, N. (2008). What are the differences between long-term, short-term, and working memory? In W. S. Sossin, J.-C. Lacaille, V. F. Castellucci, & S. Belleville (Eds.), Essence of memory: Progress in Brain Research (Vol. 169, pp. 323–338). Elsevier. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0079-6123(07)00020-9
Major synthesis · Foundational argument · Moderate · Full work: 16 pages
Develop a vocabulary for interpreting memory tasks without assuming that each task measures a separate mental store. Connect attention and long-term knowledge to temporary performance.
A question to consider. If a familiar sequence is easier to repeat than an unfamiliar one of the same length, what does that imply about interpreting a memory-span score?
Reading
6 of 11Loss of Recent Memory after Bilateral Hippocampal Lesions
Scoville, W. B., & Milner, B. (1957). Loss of recent memory after bilateral hippocampal lesions. Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery & Psychiatry, 20(1), 11–21. https://doi.org/10.1136/jnnp.20.1.11
Landmark empirical study · Historical turning point · Moderate · Full work: 11 pages
Use Cowan’s distinctions to interpret impaired and preserved performance across the clinical cases. Ask what the pattern implies about memory organization while respecting the limits of the operations and observations.
A question to consider. How could preserved conversation alongside severe difficulty retaining new experiences challenge the claim that memory is a single capacity, and why would that not locate every memory process in one structure?
Unit 4 of 6
How do knowledge and language support understanding?
Understanding requires organizing knowledge and using it in a current situation. Rosch distinguishes patterns in categories from mechanisms that might explain them. Tanenhaus and colleagues investigate how a visible scene can constrain the interpretation of words as they unfold.
Reading
7 of 11Principles of Categorization
Rosch, E. (1978). Principles of categorization. In E. Rosch & B. B. Lloyd (Eds.), Cognition and categorization (pp. 27–48). Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Foundational argument · Major synthesis · Moderate · Full work: 22 pages
Consider what makes a category useful and what typicality evidence can establish. Keep a description of category structure separate from a claim about its mental representation.
A question to consider. Why might ‘chair’ be more useful than ‘furniture’ in one task but less useful in another, and what observation would test your explanation?
Reading
8 of 11Integration of Visual and Linguistic Information in Spoken Language Comprehension
Tanenhaus, M. K., Spivey-Knowlton, M. J., Eberhard, K. M., & Sedivy, J. C. (1995). Integration of visual and linguistic information in spoken language comprehension. Science, 268(5217), 1632–1634. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.7777863
Landmark empirical study · Methodological contribution · Moderate · Full work: 3 pages
Move from organized knowledge to interpretation in a situation. Compare how the same instruction is understood in different scenes, using eye movements as evidence with a specific inferential limit.
A question to consider. Which change in a scene would distinguish an account in which context affects early interpretation from one in which it matters only after an initial misunderstanding?
Unit 5 of 6
How do we reason and choose?
A theory of thinking and a standard for judging a choice answer different questions. First clarify what a dual-process explanation claims. Then examine framing comparisons without assuming that an observed preference reversal identifies its own mechanism.
Reading
9 of 11Dual-Process Theories of Higher Cognition: Advancing the Debate
Evans, J. St. B. T., & Stanovich, K. E. (2013). Dual-process theories of higher cognition: Advancing the debate. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 8(3), 223–241. https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691612460685
Foundational argument · Critical reappraisal · Challenging · Full work: 19 pages
Evaluate the authors’ proposed distinction and their replies to objections. Connect their account of working memory to the earlier memory unit, while separating a theoretical commitment from a convenient fast–slow description.
A question to consider. Would making an answer slower necessarily make it more reflective or correct? Specify the evidence needed to interpret a change in response time.
Reading
10 of 11The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1981). The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice. Science, 211(4481), 453–458. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.7455683
Landmark empirical study · Foundational argument · Moderate · Full work: 6 pages
Distinguish a consistency standard, an observed choice pattern, and an explanation of that pattern. Use equivalent descriptions to assess framing without assigning every effect to a particular processing type.
A question to consider. Choose one pair of equivalent descriptions in the paper. Explain what stays the same, what changes in the wording, and how preferences change. Which part of that pattern would a theory of thinking still need to explain?
Unit 6 of 6
Where should an explanation of cognition stop?
The final argument revisits the boundaries of the explanations used throughout the path. A body, an action, or an external aid can affect a task in different ways; Wilson’s distinctions help state exactly what each proposal would add.
Reading
11 of 11Six Views of Embodied Cognition
Wilson, M. (2002). Six views of embodied cognition. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 9(4), 625–636. https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03196322
Major synthesis · Critical reappraisal · Moderate · Full work: 12 pages
Reconsider mental rotation, temporary remembering, and language in context through the six claims. Choose the claim that changes a specific explanation instead of using ‘embodied’ as a general endorsement.
A question to consider. For someone following directions with a map, which observation would distinguish a helpful external aid from a stronger claim about where the cognitive system’s boundary belongs?
Scope and omissions
This is a foundation across cognitive questions, not an exhaustive survey or a history of one victorious school. Its clinical, behavioral, and theoretical sources introduce ways of investigating the mind; no single task or population defines a universal cognitive architecture.
Perception extends beyond vision through audiovisual speech, but psychophysics and other sensory modalities need fuller treatment. The memory unit emphasizes retention, attention, and selective impairment; retrieval, forgetting, autobiographical memory, and false memories receive less attention. Concepts and English sentence comprehension introduce knowledge and language, without providing a full account of language production, acquisition, or cross-linguistic variation. Mental transformation and hypothetical thinking touch on problem solving, but search, insight, expertise, and creativity need their own path.
These mostly adult laboratory and conceptual works do not establish an account of development, cultural variation, emotion, or every real-world setting. Attention and reported awareness are distinguished, but consciousness and metacognition are not comprehensively reviewed. Formal computational models and neuroimaging are introduced as questions for further study rather than surveyed in depth. The optional works extend specific arguments and are separate from the core sequence.
Synthesis
A science of the mind proceeds from visible acts toward explanations of what makes them possible. The readings offer several ways to make that journey: specify a representation, compare processes, study selective impairment, or examine the contributions of body and surroundings. Each constrains the explanation differently. Their common discipline is to connect a claim about mental activity with an observation that could count against it.
Consider someone following spoken directions in a noisy station and choosing a route. Select a specific success or failure: a missed sign, a misunderstood instruction, a forgotten turn, or a changed preference. Describe the observable behavior, then propose two explanations that differ in the information or process they assume.
Design one comparison that could distinguish those explanations. State what you would hold constant, what you would measure, and how each possible result would change your interpretation. Explain what would remain unresolved about the person, the task, the body and environment, and the population to which the result might generalize. A strong answer connects a precise claim to evidence without making one measure stand for the whole mind.
Continue with How Do We Perceive the World? to investigate sensory information, perceptual judgments and action. To study how experience changes performance, choose How Does Experience Change Behavior? To investigate differences in cognitive abilities between people, choose What Is Intelligence?
Further reading
Optional. Not part of the core sequence.
- Baddeley, A. (2000). The episodic buffer: A new component of working memory? Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 4(11), 417–423. Paper. Extends the memory unit through a proposed addition to the multicomponent working-memory model. Compare the explanatory problem it addresses with Cowan’s broader distinctions.
- Squire, L. R. (2009). The legacy of patient H.M. for neuroscience. Neuron, 61(1), 6–9. Paper. Provides a later account of H.M.’s contribution and subsequent memory research. Distinguish what was reported in 1957 from conclusions drawn through later work.
- Murphy, G. L., & Medin, D. L. (1985). The role of theories in conceptual coherence. Psychological Review, 92(3), 289–316. Paper. Develops a counterweight to explanations based only on similarity by examining how background knowledge and informal theories organize concepts.
- Kruglanski, A. W., & Gigerenzer, G. (2011). Intuitive and deliberate judgments are based on common principles. Psychological Review, 118(1), 97–109. Paper. Offers a common-principles alternative to a sharp dual-process division. The paper has a published correction concerning an incorrect reference.
- Gigerenzer, G., & Gaissmaier, W. (2011). Heuristic decision making. Annual Review of Psychology, 62(1), 451–482. Paper. Extends the choice unit by asking when simple heuristics fit the structure of an environment. Consult the publisher’s erratum alongside the article.
- Poldrack, R. A. (2006). Can cognitive processes be inferred from neuroimaging data? Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 10(2), 59–63. Paper. Extends the opening inference question to brain imaging: activity associated with a process does not automatically identify that process in another task.