Psychology Reader

Dual-Process Theories of Higher Cognition: Advancing the Debate

Jonathan St. B. T. Evans and Keith E. Stanovich · 2013 · Perspectives on Psychological Science

Role
Foundational argument · Critical reappraisal
Difficulty
Challenging
Full work length
19 pages
Type
Journal article

Access

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Reading focus

Syllabus: How Can We Study the Mind?

Evaluate the authors’ proposed distinction and their replies to objections. Connect their account of working memory to the earlier memory unit, while separating a theoretical commitment from a convenient fast–slow description.

A question to consider. Would making an answer slower necessarily make it more reflective or correct? Specify the evidence needed to interpret a change in response time.

Why this reading

A useful distinction between kinds of thinking needs more than familiar contrasts such as fast and slow. Evans and Stanovich defend a particular distinction, address objections, and clarify what evidence would make a dual-process explanation informative.

Before you read

Type 1 and Type 2 label proposed kinds of processing, not two people inside the head. Working memory supports holding and manipulating information. Cognitive decoupling means representing a possibility separately from what is currently believed or perceived. A descriptive theory explains thinking; a normative standard evaluates a conclusion or choice.

Read for

  1. Separate the defining features proposed for the two types from characteristics that are only often associated with them.
  2. Follow the roles assigned to autonomy, working memory, and hypothetical thinking.
  3. Identify the criticisms the authors consider strongest and assess whether their replies require revising a theory or defending it more precisely.

Consider afterwards

  1. A practiced expert answers quickly and correctly, while a novice reasons slowly and makes a mistake. Which simplistic dual-process claims would this challenge, and would it refute the account defended here?

Editorial context

This is a position paper within an active theoretical debate, not a consensus taxonomy or a new experiment. The authors do not equate Type 1 with irrationality and Type 2 with correctness. The common-principles account by Kruglanski and Gigerenzer offers a substantive counterposition.